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THE FEDERALIST CONSTITUTION AS A 
PROJECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
David M. Golove* & Daniel J. Hulsebosch** 
 
The simple circumstance, that your Constitution forces international law on 
you, as an integral part of your studies . . . is, in my opinion, an advantage 
far beyond that of our superior accuracy (if we have it) in our own common 
law, acquired by the comparatively narrow range of our studies. 
—Sir John Taylor Coleridge to Joseph Story1 
INTRODUCTION 
When early Americans talked governance, they used the language of the 
law of nations.  Representative government was the keystone; republican 
ideology circulated widely; liberal ideas of trade and rights percolated; and 
reformed Protestantism and newly scientific notions of race informed early 
American political thought as well.  Early Americans spoke all these 
languages in their eclectic pursuit of novus ordo seclorum.  Yet when it came 
time to govern—to imagine the federal state, draft the Constitution, and then 
to formulate and administer policy—no language was more commonly 
deployed than that of the law of nations. 
Claiming membership in a world of self-denominated “civilized nations,” 
the revolutionaries had little choice.  Necessity, however, was also 
opportunity.  The law of nations was their ticket to membership.  This was 
not just because it was the lingua franca of diplomacy.  In addition to 
mediating relations between nations, the eighteenth-century law of nations 
also provided resources for envisioning how to govern a nation internally.  
This language was not just discourse.  Its referents included principles, 
doctrines, dispute resolution institutions, and compendia of “best practices” 
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circulating through Enlightenment Europe.  It also imported a reflective, 
sociable style of reasoning, in which nations were supposed to make 
decisions by imagining how other nations would judge them.  In sum, the law 
of nations was a language for working through the process of building a state 
that was supposed, in concert with others, to contribute to “civilization.”2 
Three dimensions of the early modern law of nations made it especially 
useful to American state builders.  First was its strictly international 
dimension, which overlaps with what is now called public international law.  
Its main elements were treaties and the customary law of nations.  A second 
dimension contained a host of historical examples of domestic governmental 
institutions and policies, as well as an ongoing transnational conversation 
about what it meant to be a civilized nation.  The founding generation drew 
on this dimension, which today might be called comparative constitutional 
law, to build and navigate the complex federal structure of its government.  
Finally, a third, transnational dimension contained natural law principles and 
common usages that were supposed to help coordinate cross-border relations 
among states and their citizens.  Commercial and maritime law were 
exemplary, providing or aspiring to uniform rules for transactions between 
private actors.  Yet unlike today, few in the eighteenth century referred to 
these bodies of law as “private law.”  They too were branches of the general 
law of “civilized” states. 
Recovering this three-stranded language of governance sheds light on the 
origins and early history of the U.S. Constitution.  Most generally, it reveals 
the pervasiveness of the law of nations within early American governance—
its centrality in not only assisting the revolutionary generation to gain 
independence but also in constructing and implementing a working 
government.  The intense resort to the law of nations also illuminates the 
connection between the domestic and the foreign, constitution making and 
diplomacy, commerce and international civilization.  In addition, early 
Americans’ use of the law of nations reveals the complex interplay between 
rule boundedness, on the one hand, and creativity and rule avoidance, on the 
other.  The law of nations was, like many legal languages, full of self-
deceiving aspiration.  It was also made to be used and could be remade along 
the way.  Like any functional language, it helped people realize their projects, 
but because those projects were so diverse and at times contradictory, it could 
never rationalize them all.  The law of nations was, therefore, critical to the 
founding generation’s attempt to govern the ungovernable.  Because legal 
understandings of the founding generation continue to influence 
constitutional construction more than two centuries later—and not only 
among originalists—recovering early Americans’ use of the law of nations 
facilitates a deeper understanding of their revolutionary project. 
 
 2. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation:  The Early 
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 936–37 (2010). 
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I.  THE LAW OF NATIONS AND CONSTITUTION MAKING 
Few people immersed themselves more deeply in the law of nations than 
revolutionary Americans.  They developed the faith of new, sometimes 
desperate, converts.  From the Declaration of Independence and the writing 
of state constitutions, to the forging of a confederation to wage war and make 
treaties, the institutions, forms, and doctrines of the law of nations structured 
the quest to escape the British Empire and create new republican 
governments.  Peace then opened fissures among the states, which revealed 
international problems whose solutions, and even apprehension, depended on 
the law of nations.  Consequently, debate over the relationship between 
republicanism and the legal norms of what the revolutionaries called the 
“civilized world” featured large when they wrote and ratified the 
Constitution.3 
Yet the law of nations only became a basic idiom of American governance 
when the founding generation turned from constitution making to federal 
state building and struggled to convert sparse text into effective government.  
They continually used it to explain, justify, or oppose some policy or 
institution that was claimed to be necessary or beneficial.  Contestation and 
debate about the meaning and place of the law of nations within American 
governance then circulated widely throughout American political culture.4 
The law of nations was a transatlantic language.  Americans’ use of it was 
not exceptional.  Yet because of the complexity of American government—
its federal structure, separated powers, and cascading claims rights—as well 
as the distinctive tendency to constitutionalize all manner of controversy in 
popular debates, the American idiom of this transatlantic language was 
unusual.  If Federalists labored to build a constitution that would fit the nation 
into a world supposedly operating under law, they did so in ways that 
complicated the very object sought. 
The constitutional status of the law of nations was from the beginning 
vexed with ambiguity.  Because of its various dimensions, different parts of 
the law had different degrees of obligation.  Constitution makers 
incorporated some aspects of the law of nations within their design and then 
acted as though others that defined nationhood in contemporary terms would 
be obligatory as well.  They also drew on the comparative law of nations to 
build and manage their state and assumed that courts would resort to the 
transnational law of nations for rules of decision in cases that raised issues 
within its ambit.  The result was a complex incorporation of the law of 
nations—binding for some purposes, adopted implicitly in others, and 
privileged or preferred in transnational disputes between private individuals. 
The pluralism of the law of nations was part of its attraction.  Its 
capaciousness offered American leaders the illusion, occasionally real, of 
administrative mastery.  Even where the law of nations did not deliver clear 
answers, it often offered ways to think through problems.  Ordinary 
 
 3. Id. at 947–49. 
 4. See id. at 1015–61. 
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Americans and their lawyers similarly grabbed elements of the law of nations 
to make their way in an unruly and expansive empire.  Here, the view from 
capitols, courts, countinghouses, and quarter sections overlapped:  the law of 
nations offered ways of imagining a more advantageous future, ordering the 
disordered, and governing spaces and peoples that resisted government. 
The mix within the law of nations of mandate and model justifies applying 
the term “governance” to capture early Americans’ use of that law.  
Governance connotes the project of managing and ordering in the absence of 
undisputed sovereign authority or enforcement capacity.  The concept 
originated in scholarship on public administration that analyzed 
undergoverned or ungovernable areas of the world, from cities to 
international relations.5  Even in the absence of a coherent international 
government, for example, institutions of global governance have had 
substantial effects on national government, international commerce, and 
individual lives.6  Similarly, in the early United States, the law of nations 
offered resources for imagining a more ordered future and trying to realize 
it. 
As imaginative as early Americans were in their use of the law of nations, 
there were limits to how innovative they could be.  In contrast to the purely 
domestic aspects of their constitutional system or, in historically accurate 
terms, American municipal law, the law of nations was never theirs to shape 
at pleasure.  It was a collective, international project.  This aspect of the early 
modern law of nations has been difficult for modern scholars to understand 
and convey historically.  The reasons go beyond the typical complexity of 
marking out the boundaries and function of a body of law that extended 
across time and space and whose jurisdiction and substance were continually 
debated.  These problems characterize many bodies of law, including ones 
familiar to early American lawyers and historians.  The “common law” is a 
prime example.  Instead, the difficulty with the law of nations is the 
aspirational premise:  the notion of a common project across borders.  One 
reason for this difficulty might be the twentieth-century development of 
human rights law, along with independent international courts, which critics, 
including many in the United States, perceive as encroaching on national 
sovereignty.  Many American scholars who are skeptical of modern human 
rights law also embrace originalism as a method of constitutional 
interpretation.7  The combination sometimes generates extreme denials of 
legal cosmopolitanism in early America, leaving some to conclude that the 
 
 5. Cf. Anthony Pagden, The Genesis of “Governance” and Enlightenment Conceptions 
of the Cosmopolitan World Order, 50 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 7 (1998).  See generally Marie-Claude 
Smouts, The Proper Use of Governance in International Relations, 50 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 81 
(1998). 
 6. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, The Administrative Law Frontier in Global 
Governance, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 143 (2005); Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword:  
Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to Global 
Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 1. 
 7. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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law of nations in early America was at most a species of state law.8  Evidence 
of more robust engagement with the law of nations then becomes a problem 
to minimize, explain away, or ignore.9 
Deemphasizing the early American engagement with the law of nations, 
however, obscures much of what makes the Federalist Constitution 
intriguing, strange, and almost foreign to modern eyes.  Yet recovering that 
commitment also begins to reveal the complex ambitions of revolutionary 
constitution making that do resonate with modern ambitions and anxieties 
surrounding global interdependence.  Their problems were not ours; their 
debates and solutions very different.  Still, their efforts to draw new 
jurisdictions to extend across and integrate different polities; their grappling 
with the law of slavery; their expropriation of indigenous land through 
treaties; their ambivalence toward a self-righteous Atlantic world shot 
through with inequality, state-supported violence, and (a favorite catchall) 
“corruption”—their groping, in other words, to build a nation that would 
participate in but also claim to improve an extranational project of 
civilization—sometimes looks familiar, like scattered cognates in an epic 
composed in a forgotten language.10  What is lost is the structure of this early 
American language of governance. 
II.  THE FUNCTIONAL LANGUAGE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 
When early Americans turned to the law of nations, what did they find in 
it?  And what was in it for them?  Instead of offering an intellectual genealogy 
of the law of nations or a list of vaunted Enlightenment legal principles that 
influenced American constitution making, we begin by suggesting how early 
Americans used it.  What sorts of law jobs did they believe the law of nations 
was fit to perform?  The short answer is many—a multitude that only 
increased after the American Revolution. 
The law of nations was familiar to North Americans even before the 
Revolution.  Elements of it had long circulated in the colonies.  Prize courts 
operated during the (frequent) imperial wars.  Law of nations treatises were 
required reading in the capstone course on moral philosophy in the growing 
number of colonial colleges.11  In law offices, many mentors assigned the 
literature of the law of nations to their charges, praising it as essential to the 
formation of a citizen of the Enlightenment.  That does not mean, however, 
that all students took it on as such.  The law of nations, like most fields of 
law, was usually learned as needed.  John Adams gives evidence.  After 
ignoring his esteemed mentor’s advice about the salutary effects of reading 
 
 8. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law 
as Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). 
 9. See, e.g., ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2017); Eugene Kontorovich, Originalism and the 
Difficulties of History in Foreign Affairs, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39 (2008). 
 10. Cf. David Armitage, In Defense of Presentism, in HISTORY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 
(Darrin M. McMahon ed., forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors). 
 11. Benjamin C. Lyons, John Jay and the Law of Nations in the Diplomacy of the 
American Revolution (2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with authors). 
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the law of nations during his apprenticeship, Adams put himself on a crash 
course in the 1760s to harness the mythic ideal of European confederation as 
an argument against parliamentary supremacy.12  Soon the law of nations 
became an essential resource for the revolutionaries as they forged a 
confederation, converted an imperial rebellion into an international war, and 
negotiated alliances and commercial treaties.13 
By late 1774, future U.S. attorney general William Bradford wrote college 
classmate James Madison that the Continental Congress was meeting in the 
same building that held the “City Library . . . of which the Librarian tells me 
the Gentlemen make great & constant use.”14  He went on to report “I was 
told Vattel, Barlemaqui Locke & Montesquie[u] seem to be the standar[d]s 
to which they refer either when settling the rights of the Colonies or when a 
dispute arises on the Justice or propriety of a measure.”15  The next year, 
Benjamin Franklin received three copies of Emmerich de Vattel’s treatise, 
The Law of Nations, from a friend and translator in the Netherlands.16  The 
book arrived after the first battles of the Revolution had begun, though before 
the Declaration of Independence.17  “It came to us in good season,” Franklin 
wrote in his note of thanks, “when the circumstances of a rising state make it 
necessary frequently to consult the law of nations.”18  Serving in the Second 
Continental Congress, he reported that the book “has been continually in the 
hands of the members of our congress, now sitting.”19  It was a book to be 
used. 
When the delegates turned its pages, what did they find?  Vattel’s treatise 
is remembered as an influential primer on what is now called international 
law.  It was that, but it was also much more.  Early modern law of nations 
treatises were moralistic advice manuals written for statesmen and their 
advisors and were intended to be put to work.  They descended from a 
Renaissance advice book genre known as “mirror for princes.”20  The treatise 
writers tried to persuade the prince that it was not primarily his honor and 
gain that was at stake in his decisions.  The honor and flourishing of the 
nation and its people were paramount.  In the new United States, there was 
no princely sovereign.  According to republican theory, sovereignty rested in 
 
 12. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio:  Constitution-Making and the 
Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 799–800 (2014). 
 13. See id.; see also ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 18–20, 79–80, 124–26 (2010). 
 14. Letter from William Bradford to James Madison (Oct. 17, 1774), in 1 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 125, 126 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., ser. 1 1962) (alteration in 
original). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas (Dec. 9, 1775), 
reprinted in 22 THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 287, 287–91 (William B. Willcox ed., 
1982). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Mirror for Presidents:  George Washington and the Law of 
Nations, in POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 243, 251 
(Ben Lowe ed., 2021). 
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the people.21  Yet these treatises remained instructive for advisors of the 
newly sovereign American people, trying to build a new kind of state. 
In his treatise, Vattel detailed the rights and duties of a sovereign.  Above 
all, the sovereign was supposed to protect his people and avoid war.  “The 
end or object of civil society,” Vattel argued, 
is to procure for the citizens whatever they stand in need of, for the 
necessities, the conveniences, the accommodation of life, and, in general, 
whatever constitutes happiness,—with the peaceful possession of property, 
a method of obtaining justice with security, and, finally a mutual defence 
against all external violence.22 
The sovereign owed the people the protection of life, liberty, and property—
and happiness.23 
More specifically, Vattel divided the rules or “maxims” of sovereign duties 
into four categories.  Book I of his treatise covered “Of Nations considered 
in themselves,” or a nation’s domestic constitution and policies.24  Book II 
analyzed “Of a Nation considered in its Relations to others,” or international 
relations.25  Book III, “Of War,” discussed when peaceful relations with other 
nations failed.26  Book IV, “Of the Restoration of Peace; and of Embassies,” 
surveyed treaties and the various categories of diplomatic emissaries.27  The 
laws of war, which modern scholars often treat as the centerpiece of the law 
of nations, accounted for less than a third of Vattel’s treatise.  In comparison, 
Part I’s maxims for good government accounted for about the same.  
Consequently, Vattel’s book provided as much advice about the best policies 
within a nation as it did about peaceful international relations. 
The early modern law of nations as the revolutionaries encountered it, 
therefore, embraced far more than law between states.  It also included 
comparative examples indicating how to govern in an “enlightened” manner, 
and in this sense was a precursor of modern comparative constitutional law.  
It was filled with historical examples, abstract principles, and disagreement 
carried out in indirect conversations among jurists, leaders, and not least, 
writers who wished to advise leaders and administer their governments.  This 
dimension was a legacy of the oldest connotation of the law of nations:  the 
jus gentium, or the law that the Romans claimed was, or should be, common 
to all peoples.28  The concept is echoed in the modern international law 
notion of jus cogens, as well as in “best practices,” and other aspects of 
 
 21. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:  THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 49–57 (1988). 
 22. EMER DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 86 (Béla Kapossy et al eds., Liberty Fund 2008) 
(1758) (emphasis omitted). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. at 81. 
 25. Id. at 259. 
 26. Id. at 469. 
 27. Id. at 651. 
 28. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Comment, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 129, 133 (2005). 
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modern transnational law.29  It was here that the law of nations literature 
retained its closest connection to those Renaissance instructional guides, the 
most (in)famous—but also most unrepresentative—example of which was 
Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince.30  Indeed, Vattel explicitly criticized 
Machiavelli for celebrating Caesar Borgia’s “mischievous” policies.31  In 
contrast, Vattel instructed the good ruler to promote agriculture, commerce, 
education, immigration, and infrastructure that would transport the people 
and their goods.32  That infrastructure should include granaries, public 
markets, and even banks.33  Sovereigns should also control coinage and 
public spending and protect the liberty of religious conscience even if they 
established one denomination.34  It was not an exclusive enumeration.  Vattel 
recommended all these domestic policies, and others, before any mention of 
diplomacy.  The premise, however, was that good domestic policy 
conditioned foreign policy, and the elements of good policy were 
transnational.  It was the sovereign’s duty to help its subjects reach their 
potential, as individuals and together as a nation.35  Then they could 
participate productively in the wider world. 
Vattel’s book was only one among many, of course, and there was much 
more to the law of nations than books.  Still, the multidimensionality of his 
treatise, its compendium of principles for governance at home and abroad, 
and its guidance for promoting interactions between individuals in different 
states captured central and, to the founders, attractive aspects of the early 
modern law of nations.  Although nominally addressed to sovereigns, the real 
audience comprised men who would be advisors to the prince, rather than the 
prince himself.  In a new republic in which the sovereign was an 
abstraction—the people themselves—there was a ready audience for a 
resource meant to aid those advising others.  They could serve the people, 
construct the state, and then govern that state, all the while positioning 
themselves, at home and abroad, as civilized men of the Enlightenment. 
A legal regime is more than a compendium of principles and rules, maxims 
and examples.  It also conveys a style of reasoning.  Early Americans 
believed that the law of nations contained a distinct form of legal reasoning 
that tended to improve each nation over time:  comparative analysis, with the 
goal of identifying the best institutions, all to the end of increasing the 
sovereign’s reputation.36 
As a law that crossed borders and regulated interactions between different 
nations and their peoples, the law of nations depended on reflexive self-
 
 29. See id. at 130–31. 
 30. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Peter Bondanella trans. & ed., 2005) (1532). 
 31. VATTEL, supra note 22, at 289. 
 32. Id. at 128–46. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 142, 156–61. 
 35. Id. at 126. 
 36. David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “The Known Opinion of the Impartial 
World”:  Foreign Relations and the Law of Nations in The Federalist, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO THE FEDERALIST 114, 124–29 (Jack N. Rakove & Collen A. Sheehan eds., 
2020). 
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enforcement within each nation.  The motivation was not, however, blind 
rule fealty, on the one hand, or fear of retaliation from other nations in the 
form of war, on the other.  In between habit and fear lay reputation, which in 
turn depended on the presumed collective judgment of those nations.  
Because nations were only abstractions, the real motor force was the 
perceived reputation of a nation’s people.  The first line of federal decision 
makers was crucial.  This helps explain why federal constitution makers 
divided and separated foreign affairs powers and why they created a judiciary 
more independent from the political branches than those in the states.  
Buffered from everyday politics, federal decision makers were supposed to 
imagine the response of the civilized world to their policy choices.  James 
Madison captured this decision-making ethic in Federalist No. 63 when, 
defending the six-year tenure of senators, he underscored the importance of 
“the national councils . . . possess[ing] that sensibility to the opinion of the 
world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to 
obtain, its respect and confidence,” adding that “the presumed or known 
opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.”37 
Knowledge of the law of nations could not be confined, however, to a 
small cadre of federal officials.  In a representative republic, the concentric 
circles of decision-making expanded beyond government officials to include 
ordinary lawyers and even the people themselves.  In a republic, all of these 
actors had leverage over government personnel or policy.  Hence there was 
an ambitious project in the early Republic of educating lawyers and the 
broader public in the principles and rules encompassed in treaties and the law 
of nations.  Law teachers like James Wilson, James Kent, and Joseph Story 
organized their lectures and treatises around the international and 
transnational aspects of the law of nations.  They emphasized, as James 
Wilson put it, that “[t]o love and to deserve honest fame, is another duty of 
the people.”38  Only if the people themselves identified with the nation’s 
reputation would they participate in republican governance in the right way.  
Doing so was in their collective interest because “[t]he reputation of a state 
is not only . . . pleasant, it is also a valuable possession” that is acquired by 
the virtue expressed in “the public transactions of the state,” as well as “the 
private behavior of its members.”39  Similarly, James Kent instructed 
students at Columbia College that “the faithful observance of [the law of 
nations] is essential to universal happiness” and that “[i]ts noble aim is to 
preserve peace, kind offices, and good faith, amongst mankind in their 
national intercourse.”40  Judges and jurists propounded the law of nations in 
jury charges and a stream of public print because, again in Wilson’s terms, 
“[a] weighty part of the public business is transacted by the citizens at large,” 
 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 423 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 38. JAMES WILSON, Lectures on Law, Part 1, Chapter 4:  Of the Law of Nations, reprinted 
in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 128, 142 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan 
& Co. 1896). 
 39. Id. 
 40. JAMES KENT, DISSERTATIONS:  BEING THE PRELIMINARY PART OF A COURSE OF LAW 
LECTURES 51 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1795). 
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not least in selecting their representatives.41  This didactic effort presumed 
that the public sought “general and just knowledge” of the law of nations and 
could “form a rational judgment” about how it had been or should be 
applied.42  Paradoxically, Wilson observed, the law of nations, though 
originally the law of kings in monarchical states, was “of peculiar importance 
in free ones,” for “the practice of the law of nations . . . must, in a free 
government, depend very considerably on the acts of the citizens.”43  The 
constitutional project would only succeed if the people, and not just their 
leaders, incorporated the law of nations into their thought and behavior. 
III.  THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN FEDERAL 
STATE-BUILDING 
The founding generation made use of the law of nations in many ways.  
Three areas in which the law of nations played a central role in federal 
governance were:  structuring its international relations, designing the 
structure and institutions of the federal state, and providing the law that 
governed an array of transnational legal subjects. 
The role of the law of nations in international relations corresponds closely 
to the role of modern international law in contemporary international 
relations, only the law of nations was conceived of more capaciously.  Like 
modern international law, the law of nations specified the binding obligations 
states owed to one another and framed their diplomacy.  Equally important, 
however, were its nonbinding rules and maxims.  Like the now much-
discussed role of nonbinding norms in enforcing the spirit of the Constitution, 
the law of nations’ maxims were supposed to inform and guide the foreign 
policy of nations and help achieve the larger pacific aims of the system.  Early 
American statesmen and lawyers were fully aware of the difference between 
binding and nonbinding obligations, but it is striking how little attention they 
paid to the distinction, freely invoking the law of nations in general without, 
at least much of the time, noticing the difference.44  This Essay only touches 
on the use of the law of nations in this area, not because it is less important 
than its use in the others but rather, because it is the most familiar and best 
understood of the areas and, therefore, less necessary to develop here. 
The role of the law of nations in the second area—constructing the federal 
state—is less familiar.  Much has been written about the influence of the 
 
 41. WILSON, supra note 38, at 128; see also Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as 
Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127. 
 42. WILSON, supra note 38, at 129. 
 43. Id. at 128–29. 
 44. On early understandings of the distinction between the binding and nonbinding parts 
of the law of nations, see generally William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary 
International Law:  Some Lessons from History, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 169 (2010); Golove 
& Hulsebosch, supra note 36, at 116.  For an example of the use of nonbinding, typically 
prudential, maxims in debates over foreign policy in the founding era, see Alexander 
Hamilton, The Defence No. II, in 18 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 493, 494 (Harold 
C. Syrett ed., 1973) (observing that “[w]hen one nation has cause of complaint against another, 
the course marked out by practice, the opinion of writers, and the principles of humanity, the 
object being to avoid War, is to precede reprisals of any kind by a demand of reparation”). 
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common law in the design of the Constitution, but the arguably more 
pervasive influence of the law of nations over the Constitution is much less 
appreciated.  In this area, the founders drew on portions of the law of nations 
that resemble what we today call comparative constitutional law but was then 
understood as an aspect of the general public law—the part of the law of 
nations that conveyed general principles of governance.  Whether it was in 
designing the mechanisms through which the law of nations and treaties 
would be incorporated into municipal law or war would be initiated and 
waged or in structuring the federal system in both its vertical and horizontal 
dimensions, they turned to the law of nations to guide their thinking. 
Finally, the eighteenth-century law of nations included legal principles and 
rules governing transactions across national boundaries—transactions that 
today would be categorized under private law.  These included the law 
merchant, the maritime law, the conflict of laws, and parts of the laws of war 
governing the conduct of a nation’s own citizens.  Here, again, states were 
not obligated to adopt and apply these parts of the law of nations, but the 
founders expected and intended that in some form they would be applicable 
in the new federal system.  How that was supposed to work raises many 
difficulties in reconstruction, which we do not pursue here.  The point we 
emphasize is that the adoption of these bodies of law meant that the law of 
nations would play an outsize role in regulating even private transactions 
between individuals and would consequently be the subject of ongoing 
debate, especially in the courts, which were responsible for applying them. 
A.  The Law of Nations in American Diplomacy and Foreign Policymaking 
The role of the law of nations in imposing legal obligations on states in 
their interactions—the violation of which rendered them legally 
accountable—was central to the conduct of the new nation’s foreign 
relations.  Although strangely underappreciated in much contemporary 
scholarship, this point is neither new nor surprising.  Any review of the 
debates and discussions about American foreign policy among executive 
officials and diplomats, and in Congress and the courts, from the outset of 
the American Revolution to the conclusion of the War of 1812—what we 
call the “Extended Founding”—leaves no room for debate.  The law of 
nations appears everywhere—its importance was recognized by all, its 
influence on policy and discourse was pervasive, and its veneration among 
the Enlightenment-inspired and increasingly legally fluent political class was 
sometimes over the top. 
That discussion and debate about the law of nations appeared so centrally 
in the early Republic’s foreign policy crises should seem revelatory only to 
those whose experience in foreign affairs is limited to recent decades, when 
so many government officials and legislators—and even judges—express 
antipathy and contempt for international law.  Indeed, the law of nations 
played a critical role in each of the new country’s many foreign policy 
challenges, including the early effort to conclude a military alliance with 
France during the American Revolution; the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great 
1852 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
Britain; the humiliations that American diplomats suffered in Europe; the 
crisis over state violations of the Treaty of Peace under the Confederation 
government that provided a crucial prompt for the convening of the 
Philadelphia Convention; the first major foreign policy crisis after adoption 
of the Constitution—the so-called Nootka Sound affair; the Neutrality Crisis 
of 1793, in which the fate of the French alliance seemed to turn on the 
interpretation of an “ill-understood scrap in Vattel”;45 the Louisiana 
Purchase; and the long decade of disputes with Great Britain over 
impressment and American neutral rights that culminated in the War of 
1812.46  The law of nations was front and center in each of these challenges, 
providing not only the system of rules within which the nation was obliged 
to proceed as it sought to advance its interests and ideals but also the precepts, 
maxims, and forms of discourse for conducting diplomacy and for debating 
among themselves the policy decisions with which they were confronted.  
When considering foreign relations, federal officials in the executive branch, 
Congress, and the federal judiciary turned continually to the law of nations 
to locate governing rules and principles to guide them whenever international 
questions arose in their respective domains.47  Measuring federal decision-
making against the law of nations was pervasive and uncontroversial. 
B.  Constitutional Construction and the Law of Nations as the Public Law 
of the Civilized World 
In addition to its central role in international affairs, the law of nations 
played a pervasive role in the construction of the federal state.  The founders 
wished to ensure that the federal government was fully empowered to act the 
part of a civilized nation.48  In the first instance, that meant resorting to the 
law of nations for aid in developing institutional mechanisms, sometimes 
quite innovative, to ensure that the United States would conduct itself in 
accordance with the standards demanded by the European state system.49  
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The founders were concerned not only with incorporating these aspects of 
the law of nations into the very definition of the granted powers, thereby 
making the law of nations part of the law of the land, but also with developing 
institutional arrangements that would facilitate its enforcement.50 
More broadly, when envisioning how to structure their own complex 
polity, the founders reached reflexively for assistance to resources in the law 
of nations.  In this respect, the law of nations did not purport to offer binding 
mandates for states.  Instead, it consisted of an amorphous body of learning 
and examples derived from the publicists on the law of nations, 
Enlightenment philosophers and theorists, and the evolving customs, or best 
practices, of “civilized nations.”  As a kind of comparative public or 
constitutional law, it yielded concepts, principles, maxims, and discourses 
supposed to guide the organization and administration of an effective and just 
state. 
Those resources were not relevant only with respect to institutional 
arrangements for the conduct of foreign relations.  In this dimension, the law 
of nations had an open-ended quality, which left room for considerable 
variation in practice and for developing its principles.  American statesmen 
drew from these ideas and discourses in designing and implementing many 
of the fundamental structural arrangements in the Constitution and, at the 
same time, viewed themselves as contributing to its progressive 
development.  They extolled the advances in understanding reflected in the 
law of nations but also insisted that the American Revolution had generated 
advances in political thinking, derived mostly from republicanism. 
1.  The Incorporation of the Law of Nations into American Municipal Law 
In this section, we explore some of the mechanisms by which the founders 
sought to ensure that the new nation would comply with its international legal 
obligations, and we emphasize how they drew inspiration from the law of 
nations in carrying out this part of their plan. 
a.  Direct Incorporation of the Law of Nations into the Constitutional Text 
Less well appreciated than the role of the law of nations in American 
foreign policy is the extent to which the founders incorporated its principles 
and institutions into the text of the Constitution.  This incorporation signaled 
to a watchful international audience the nation’s commitment to uphold its 
legal duties, exercise concomitant national powers, and embrace the role of 
a civilized nation.  Famously, the term “law of nations” only appears once in 
the text—in the relatively obscure Offenses Clause—which grants Congress 
the power “[t]o define and Punish . . . Offences against the Law of 
Nations.”51  This textual lacuna has provided the grounds in modern 
constitutional law for the diminishing constitutional status of the law of 
 
 50. See id. at 1624–29. 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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nations, which has accompanied the rise of the United States as a 
superpower.52 
In fact, viewed in historical perspective, the text is filled with references 
to the law of nations, which, like cognate references to the common law (such 
as the “jury” trial),53 were meant to incorporate the bodies of law to which 
they referred.  The term “treaties” in the Treaty Clause,54 for example, was 
manifestly borrowed from the law of nations,55 and it was not only a grant of 
power to make the kinds of treaties deemed permissible in the law of nations 
but also an incorporation of the international law of treaties, with its well-
adumbrated rules for treaty interpretation, breach, force majeure, 
countermeasures, and so on.  Similarly, Congress’s power “[t]o declare 
War”56 and the president’s role as “Commander in Chief,”57—terms again 
drawn from the law of nations—were not only specifications of the branch 
with authority to exercise these functions but incorporations of the laws of 
war and neutrality into the municipal law of the United States.58 
Another example is the Constitution’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the 
federal courts,59 which was a reference, in part, to the law of nations 
institution of prize courts and to the body of law they were charged by the 
law of nations to apply.  Prize courts were among the most important 
institutions of the law of nations, holding out a promise that in wartime 
belligerents would accord fair treatment equally to all neutral nations by 
faithfully executing the laws of war and neutrality.60  In this respect, the 
institution reflected the larger pacific aspirations of the law of nations to 
minimize and limit the scope of war.  By mandating that civilized nations 
maintain prize tribunals that would apply the law of nations in resolving 
disputes over neutral rights, the law of nations discouraged belligerent 
nations from engaging in conduct that would inevitably draw neutral nations 
into their conflicts and expand the scope of war.61  Evidencing the 
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international basis of prize law, the founders simply extended the judicial 
power to admiralty and maritime cases without including a corresponding 
power in Congress to provide or alter the substantive law the courts would 
apply.62  The relevant jurisprudence was not supposed to be subject to 
municipal amendment. 
Sir William Scott captured the premise underlying the institution of prize 
courts when he declared in 1799 that they do not 
deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of 
particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice 
which the law of nations holds out without distinction to independent states, 
some happening to be neutral, and some to be belligerent.  The seat of 
judicial authority is, indeed, locally here in the belligerent country, 
according to the known law and practice of nations:  but the law itself has 
no locality.63 
Americans eagerly embraced the sentiment.  Immediately after the 
Revolution commenced, the Confederation created a complicated prize court 
system, partly state and partly federal in character.64  The Constitution 
regularized those courts and gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over 
all prize proceedings.  Thereafter, following established international 
practice, the federal courts uniformly applied the law of nations as their rules 
of decision in prize proceedings.65 
The Confederation’s approach to prize adjudication was, in one respect, in 
tension with international practice.  It had permitted the use of juries in 
deciding prize cases, a revolutionary experiment that was not countenanced 
by European nations, including Great Britain, and indeed, was roundly 
decried as a failure.66  In response, the Constitution’s drafters left Congress 
discretion over the use of civil jury trials in the federal courts, expecting it 
would employ them widely but not, for example, in prize proceedings.67  As 
Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 83, the need for this 
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discretion was directly connected to the law of nations.68  Some kinds of 
cases turned “wholly on the laws of nations.”69  But juries could not “be 
supposed competent to investigations, that require a thorough knowledge of 
the laws and usages of nations.”70  More pointedly, he added, they would 
“sometimes be under the influence of impressions” that would bias their 
inquiries, creating the “danger that the rights of other nations might be 
infringed by their decisions, so as to afford occasions of reprisal and war.”71  
Accordingly, in defending the absence of a guarantee of a jury trial in all civil 
cases against anti-Federalist criticism during the ratifying debate, Hamilton 
observed that: 
It will add great weight to this remark in relation to prize causes to mention 
that the method of determining them has been thought worthy of particular 
regulation in various treaties between different powers of Europe, and that 
pursuant to such treaties they are determinable in Great Britain in the last 
resort before the king himself in his privy council, where the fact as well as 
the law undergoes a re-examination.72 
This point “alone demonstrates,” he insisted, “the impolicy” of including in 
the Constitution a right to a jury trial in civil cases.73 
The Seventh Amendment reversed the Framers’ initial judgment, but only 
partially and with regard for Hamilton’s point:  the amendment extended the 
civil jury trial right only to “Suits at common law,”74 leaving intact the 
discretion Hamilton defended for the kinds of cases he identified as most 
clearly in tension with the principles and practices of other civilized 
nations—in particular, admiralty cases. 
b.  The Incorporation Doctrine:  The Law of Nations as Law of the Land 
and Self-Executing Treaties 
The founders also created a series of innovative institutional mechanisms 
designed to encourage the nation to comply with its law-of-nations 
obligations and fulfill its treaty commitments.  Although not mandated by the 
law of nations, which mostly left internal political arrangements to the 
discretion of each nation-state, these mechanisms were nevertheless drawn 
from the law of nations in its more capacious sense, including its principles 
for the effective management of a state’s foreign relations.  When designing 
and implementing these innovations, the founders self-consciously resorted 
to ideas and concepts of the law of nations. 
Though comprising the great bulk of litigated cases arising under the law 
of nations during the founding period, prize was nevertheless a special 
category.  With respect to other areas—for instance, the rights of foreign 
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ambassadors—there were few directory principles in the law of nations that 
specified the mechanisms by which its rules were to be made enforceable as 
municipal law in every nation.  The law of nations provided rules of decision, 
not rules of jurisdiction and institutions of enforcement.75  Nevertheless, 
European practice was not silent on the matter.  As Chief Justice John Jay 
emphasized as early as 1790, “the Laws of Nations make Part of the Laws of 
this, and of every other civilized Nation.”76  English constitutional practice 
was in accord, as reflected in Lord Mansfield’s holding that “the law of 
nations, in its full extent was part of the law of England”77 and Blackstone’s 
dictum that the law of nations “is here adopted in it’s [sic] full extent by the 
common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”78 
From the beginning—even during the Confederation—American courts 
administered the law of nations in cases falling within their jurisdiction.79  
They followed European custom when doing so, but they also claimed to 
improve on the European model and thereby to make another contribution to 
the law of nations.80  Most pointedly, as American statesmen would 
emphasize over the next several decades, federal court judges, in contrast to 
their English (and other European) counterparts, were independent of the 
executive branch and enjoyed life tenure.  This status, Americans argued, 
made their courts more likely to be impartial interpreters of the law of 
nations, capable of resisting the influence of executive officials, popular 
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opinion, and national prejudice.81  To some, the English judge’s robe was 
just a cover to hide the Englishman beneath.82  In contrast, the American 
judiciary offered the promise of a new era in which the law of nations could 
be administered fairly, even by national courts. 
The most innovative feature of the founders’ plan and another American 
contribution to the evolving law of nations was the doctrine that treaties were 
self-executing and did not require legislative implementation.  Self-execution 
arose out of the experience with treaty noncompliance during the 
Confederation and was designed to facilitate treaties’ implementation by 
assigning the task to the courts through the equally innovative institution of 
judicial review.83  Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had the 
power to make treaties.84  However, Congress lacked the power to enforce 
treaties or to force the states to do so.85  Many of the states assumed that they 
could, for example, pass retaliatory measures against Britain for what they 
perceived as violations of the Treaty of Peace.  In short, many state 
legislatures claimed the sovereign power to interpret treaties and retaliate for 
perceived infractions.86  Britain, of course, rejected the states’ claims, lodged 
its own complaints about American noncompliance, and most importantly, 
determined that because Congress lacked the power to address these issues, 
there was no point in dealing with American diplomats who were incapable 
of representing thirteen different sovereigns.87  The Confederation’s 
fragmentation thus obstructed negotiations to resolve these differences. 
Similar problems marred treaties with Native American nations.  The 
simultaneous attempts by New York State and the Confederation Congress 
to negotiate with the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1784 was perhaps the most 
catastrophic example.88  It was not only a problem of the authority to make 
treaties with Native Americans (which was at least textually ambiguous 
under the Articles),89 it was also a problem of enforcing them, as the federal 
government had to rely on the restraint of the state governments claiming 
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local jurisdiction over the relevant territory.  In land-hungry New York and 
Georgia, that restraint was absent.90 
Faced with the deteriorating international reputation of the United States, 
many incipient Federalists sought to emphasize the principle pacta sunt 
servanda—treaties must be observed—to urge constitutional reform.91  This 
was an uncontroversial principle of the law of nations.  But the Federalists 
added that treaties were also the law of the land, operating throughout the 
American states and overriding state laws to the contrary.92  In contrast to the 
practice in Britain, the Federalists insisted that the Confederation’s treaties 
became the law of the land immediately upon ratification by Congress, 
without the need for any confirmatory legislation.93  To preserve the sanctity 
of international treaty commitments, the doctrine of self-execution was born.  
The doctrine emerged in a handful of judicial cases in the 1780s, and 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs John Jay stated it clearly in 1786 in his report 
on state violations of the Treaty of Peace.94  The drafters of the new 
Constitution then institutionalized it in the Supremacy Clause.95 
In justifying this central aspect of the Constitution’s institutional 
arrangements, Federalists invoked the law of nations and the practices of 
other civilized nations.  This move was problematic because self-execution 
was so innovative.  However, it was necessary in a republic, whose 
representative legislatures were prone to be led astray by demagogues who, 
to promote their own interests, would appeal to national partialities to whip 
up hostility to foreign powers and their claims on the United States.  In 
contrast, the anti-Federalists, correctly perceiving that self-execution 
eliminated any popular legislative brake on treaty making by excluding not 
only the state legislatures but also the House of Representatives, made self-
execution a prime target for their opposition.96 
The Federalists replied by attempting to demonstrate that their innovation 
was rooted in the principles of the law of nations.  When anti-Federalists 
protested that, in republics, legislation was the supreme law, Jay responded 
that the principle of pacta sunt servanda simply could not survive such 
thinking, stating: 
These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name 
for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would 
make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but 
on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it.97 
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The Constitution’s solution to ensuring treaty compliance was thus necessary 
to enable the United States to fulfill its obligations as a civilized nation and, 
in this respect, perfectly in accord with international expectations and 
practice:  “[t]he proposed Constitution therefore has not in the least extended 
the obligation of treaties,” Jay noted.98  “They are just as binding, and just as 
far beyond the lawful reach of the legislative acts now, as they will be at any 
future period, or under any form of government.”99 
With the adoption of the Constitution, the understanding that treaties were 
the law of the land automatically upon ratification achieved widespread 
acceptance in George Washington’s cabinet, Congress, and the courts.100  By 
the mid-1790s, however, that consensus began to unravel.  The outbreak of 
the French revolutionary wars in 1792; the spread to America of increasingly 
radical French republican ideology, reflected in the passage of the French 
Constitution of 1793, which lodged the power to ratify treaties in the national 
legislature;101 and the simple fact that while the Federalists controlled the 
Senate, Republicans controlled the House102—all of these developments 
catalyzed a radical change in the way that Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, 
and their followers in Congress and the states began to view the treaty 
power.103 
The Jay Treaty crisis of 1795–96 brought the issue to a head.  Under 
Jefferson’s leadership, Republicans launched an all-out constitutional assault 
on the treaty power, insisting alternately that the power be eviscerated or that 
the House of Representatives be accorded a seat at the table.  Their most far-
reaching constitutional argument was that treaties could touch on no subject 
that fell within Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, an argument that 
plainly gutted the treaty power of any force.104  Jefferson captured the spirit 
of the Republican position, observing wryly that some “denied [this position] 
on the ground that it would leave very little matter for the treaty power to 
work on.  The less the better, say others.”105 
Republicans found themselves caught on the horns of a constitutional 
dilemma.  Their position that the House had a right to participate in the treaty-
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making process lacked credibility because the Constitution’s text granted the 
treaty power to the president by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds 
of the Senate.106  This led them to concede that the House could not 
participate in the treaty-making process but to assert instead a role for the 
House in implementing treaties that the president and Senate had already 
made if they touched on subjects within Congress’s Article I powers.  This 
position rejected the self-executing treaty doctrine, but it left them vulnerable 
to the counterargument that they were, in essence, asserting a right of the 
House to violate the principle of pacta sunt servanda.107  What else would 
the House be doing if it refused to implement a treaty the president and 
Senate had validly concluded?  But that was a position that Republicans were 
unwilling to avow.  No one believed that treaties could be treated so 
cavalierly.108 
Although they were unable to find a way out of this dilemma, Republicans 
nevertheless persisted in insisting that treaties that touched on a subject 
within Congress’s Article I powers were not self-executing and required the 
consent of the House before they became valid treaties and the supreme law 
of the land.  The exclusion of the House, and therefore the people’s 
representatives, was simply unacceptable, as the Jay Treaty—which they 
charged was an abandonment of the nation’s republican commitments on a 
global scale and a national humiliation—tragically illustrated.109 
Republicans did not only rely on these principles as a matter of abstract 
political theory but harnessed them to their own version of republican-
infused law-of-nations reasoning.  Rejecting Publius’s contention that the 
House’s composition and structure made it unfit to review and ratify 
treaties,110 Jefferson claimed that “subjecting [treaties] to the ratification of 
the Representatives” would be “no more inconvenient than to the Senate”111 
and further emphasized the recent post–French Revolution practice of 
European nations, asserting that, “[i]n all countries, I believe, except 
England, treaties are made by the legislative power.”112  Moreover, even in 
England, if treaties “touch the laws of the land, they must be approved by 
Parliament.”113 
Republicans strenuously pressed this comparative point, emphasizing how 
self-execution would make the Constitution even less republican than the 
English Constitution and the House of Representatives inferior to the House 
of Commons.114  In response, the Federalists pressed their own version of 
law-of-nations reasoning, countering the Republicans’ efforts at comparative 
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constitutional law by pointing to the disanalogies between the British and 
American systems.  The president was an elected official, unlike the king of 
Great Britain; under the English parliamentary system, as opposed to the 
American separation of powers system, the same party necessarily controlled 
both the ministries and the Commons; and, in contrast to the unilateral royal 
power to make treaties, the Senate not only participated with the president in 
the treaty-making approval process but did so under a supermajoritarian 
voting rule.115  In designing the treaty power, the founders, the Federalists 
observed, had not been inattentive to republican principles or to the principles 
and practices of the law of nations.116  In contrast, the British system was 
arrived at not through a deliberative and reasoned process of decision but as 
the contingent outcome of the long historical struggle of the Commons to 
diminish the Crown’s prerogative powers.117 
Ultimately, the Republicans failed to remodel the Constitution.  Just as the 
House was wrapping up its debate over the Jay Treaty, the U.S. Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in Ware v. Hylton.118  The decision made clear 
that the Justices unanimously viewed the self-executing treaty doctrine as 
constitutionally mandated.119  Nevertheless, the Jay Treaty debate cast a long 
shadow, and presidents and Senates were sometimes forced to acquiesce in 
the House’s participation in the treaty-making process when core 
congressional powers were engaged.  The Republican critique was absorbed 
into the constitutional system, if not as constitutional doctrine, then as a 
working political consensus. 
c.  Congressional Power over War and Peace 
Few provisions in the Constitution reflect the comparative public law 
dimension of the law of nations more fully than the power to declare war.120  
Warmaking was a defining power of legitimate nations, the ultimate means 
by which a state could enforce its legal rights.  The aspirational commitments 
of the law of nations, however, were pacific.  They were based on the ideal 
of a cooperative international order in which diverse nations, with different 
political orders, could coexist in harmony and flourish individually.  Thus, 
while recognizing the necessity of war, the law of nations sought to 
discourage it and limit its scope and destructive potential.  As Vattel put it:  
“Those things which have a tendency to promote peace are favourable; those 
that lead to war are odious.”121 
Nor was the law of nations silent on how states should structure their 
internal arrangements for deciding questions of war and peace.  For example, 
it enjoined states to vest the decision to engage in military conflict 
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exclusively in the sovereign power and to prohibit citizens from engaging in 
hostilities without authorization, punishing those who might violate this 
principle.122  Nevertheless, as a general matter, the law of nations left 
nations’ internal arrangements dealing with the warmaking power to the 
determination of municipal law. 
In vesting the power to declare war in Congress, the founders were 
engaging with these fundamental premises of the law of nations.123  
Madison’s early essay, “Universal Peace,” made this point explicit.124  
Trumpeting the American constitutional solution to the scourge of war, 
Madison considered the problem in dialogue with the utopian writings of the 
European universal peace tradition, the Scottish realists Adam Smith and 
David Hume, and the republican theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  The 
Americans, Madison maintained, had discovered the most realistic and 
efficacious mechanism ever proposed for promoting universal peace, which 
was also a fundamental tenet of republicanism:  removing the power of war 
and peace from the executive and placing it in the hands of the people’s 
representatives in Congress.125  They had thereby provided a model, which 
“[h]ad Rousseau lived to see the rapid progress of reason and reformation, 
which the present day exhibits, the philanthropy which dictated his project 
would find a rich enjoyment in the scene before him;”126 which revolutionary 
France had wisely adopted;127 and which, “[w]ere all nations to follow . . . 
the temple of Janus might be shut, never to be opened more.”128 
2.  The Law of Nations and the Construction of Federalism 
The usefulness of the law of nations to the project of constructing a federal 
state was pervasive—and peculiarly so—as the founding generation 
struggled to conceive of, and construct, its federal system.  The Articles of 
Confederation were widely conceived to be a treaty arrangement creating a 
confederation, a recognized form of the law of nations.129  The confederal 
form consisted of a central authority with given powers—usually, in that era, 
focusing on security and defense—but left intact the sovereignty, and the 
power of internal governance, of the member states.130  Except as modified 
by the treaty, moreover, the member states continued to regulate their 
relations by the principles of the law of nations.131 
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To a surprising extent, the confederal model also informed the more novel 
“Union” created by the Constitution.132  This made the law of nations highly 
relevant in shaping the Constitution, including even in the structuring of the 
ratification process (by conventions rather than by submission to state 
legislatures).133  It also meant that any modification of the default rules of 
the law of nations applying to relations among the states had to be—and in 
some cases, like the Interstate Extradition and the Fugitive Slave Clauses, 
were—included in the text.  It also meant that the law of nations would be of 
critical importance in defining the relationships among the states going 
forward. 
a.  Vertical Federalism:  The Legacy of Confederal Thought 
The very term “federal” (like “nation”) is derived from the law of 
nations.134  When drafting both the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution, moreover, the founders drew from Montesquieu’s ideas about 
the confederal form and existing examples of confederations, as in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland.  In The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu promoted 
the idea of small republics joining together in a league for mutual defense 
and security while still retaining their internal liberty,135 an idea also 
embraced by Vattel and Samuel von Pufendorf.136  This became the 
fundamental premise of the American federal order.137 
If the imperative of mutual defense prompted the founders to create the 
Confederation, it was the foreign policy frustrations of the Confederation that 
led to the Philadelphia Convention.  Most critically, the impetus was the 
Confederation’s inability to rein in the states, which repeatedly violated the 
Confederation’s treaties and the law of nations.  As Hamilton decried in his 
first bill of particulars against the Confederation:  “Are there engagements, 
to the performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men?  
These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation.”138  The result 
was a nation that had “reached almost the last stage of national humiliation.  
There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or degrade the character 
of an independent nation, which we do not experience.”139  The need to 
ensure that the United States would uphold its international commitments 
and act the part of a civilized nation was the motivating force behind 
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constitutional reform and the newly enhanced powers of the federal 
government.140 
The Constitution’s effort to form “a more perfect Union”141 was less a 
rejection of the fundamental Montesquieuian idea of a complex polity than 
an attempt to improve it in light of experience with the states’ foreign policy 
failures.  And to defend the Constitution’s strengthening of the confederal 
model, Federalists again had recourse to literature of the law of nations.  
Hamilton, for example, drew from the writings of the Abbé de Mably, who 
was among the most insightful writers in the law of nations tradition, to argue 
that a more integrated union was necessary to avoid conflict and even war 
among the states.142  When warning of the disastrous consequences of 
disunion, Federalists did not claim that Americans were obliged to follow 
Montesquieu’s models or Mably’s insights.  They selected among and 
modified the received learning.  The point, however, is that the law of nations 
provided them with useful resources for state making, and its leading 
exponents were esteemed authorities whose wisdom was taken seriously, if 
not followed by rote.  Moreover, they imagined that their innovations would 
in turn provide a model for other nations to follow, as Benjamin Franklin 
explained to a European correspondent after the conclusion of the 
Philadelphia Convention:  “I do not see why you might not in Europe carry 
the project of good Henry the Fourth into execution, by forming a federal 
union and one grand republic of all the different states and kingdoms, by 
means of a like convention, for we had many interests to reconcile.”143 
Nor did the importance of the confederal model disappear after ratification.  
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson again drew on international 
jurisprudence a dozen years later when advocating the “compact” theory of 
the Constitution in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions,144 which John C. 
Calhoun and other Southerners later elaborated during the antebellum era.145  
Traces of the theory still influence constitutional thought today.146 
b.  Horizontal Federalism:  The Law of Nations and Default Relations 
Among the States 
That the law of nations provided models and concepts for building and 
understanding the federal government should, on reflection, be easily 
understandable.  The law of nations was, after all, concerned with the 
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meaning of political nationhood.  More surprising is the role it played in 
defining the relations among the states in the federal system—what is today 
called horizontal federalism. 
Consistent with the practice of treaty-based confederations, Article II of 
the Articles of Confederation declared that, except as “expressly” agreed 
otherwise, “[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, 
and every power, jurisdiction and right.”147  One implication of this 
reservation was that, notwithstanding their treaty of confederation, the states 
continued to relate to one another as independent sovereigns.  A further 
implication was that the default rule for determining their rights and 
obligations toward one another, except as modified by the Articles, was the 
law of nations. 
The Constitution as originally drafted did not include a similar provision, 
but the Tenth Amendment reintroduced a similar notion in more ambiguous 
language.148  The deep question of how far the Constitution went in creating 
a nation, as opposed to merely strengthening a more limited union among the 
states, has been the source of endless controversy among historians, 
constitutional lawyers, and political leaders throughout U.S. history.149  Yet, 
the implication that the relations among the states would be governed by the 
law of nations was never especially controversial. 
The quasi-international relationship between the individual states was to 
be implemented, at least in part, through Article III of the Constitution’s grant 
of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in “controversies between two 
or more States.”150  The states could, like nations, negotiate settlements or 
compacts with each other, although they needed federal approval.151  
However, Article III encouraged them to submit bilateral disputes to 
courts.152  Here was yet another innovation on the law of nations:  nations 
were not required to submit their controversies to a court but were limited to 
negotiation or war as the only means of resolving their disputes.  That made 
international relations a perilous realm in which might, not right, threatened 
to decide controversies.  Among the American states, however, a different 
method, based on law and impartial adjudication, would prevail, and it later 
provided a model for reforming international law. 
The Constitution did not only refer implicitly to the law of nations in 
structuring state-to-state disputes.  That law also defined claims of state 
power and individual right against the backdrop of early modern 
understandings of the legislative competence of states.  Leading examples 
are found in Article IV.  The Interstate Extradition Clause, for example, 
mandates that fugitives from justice in one state found in another must be 
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“delivered up” to the former.153  That provision, written in the language of 
the law of nations,154 was added because of the background rule that each 
nation’s jurisdiction was exclusive within its own territory and therefore no 
nation was obligated to extradite fugitives to another.  Instead, early modern 
nations sometimes consented to extradition in bilateral treaties.  In other 
words, the Interstate Extradition Clause reflects the founding assumption that 
the law of nations would govern the relationship between individual states in 
the absence of an explicit provision to the contrary in the Constitution.155 
A similar explanation elucidates the Constitution’s treatment of slavery, 
especially the Fugitive Slave Clause.156  Debate in Europe and the Americas 
over the legitimacy and morality of slavery gained momentum during the 
eighteenth century.157  The deaccessioning of slavery from the law of nations, 
in particular, was energized by Lord Mansfield’s 1772 decision in Somerset 
v. Stewart158 (Somerset’s Case),which proclaimed that slavery could not be 
reconciled with the law of nature but depended instead on the positive 
municipal law of a particular locality for its existence.159  Mansfield, chief 
justice of the Court of King’s Bench, tied this conception of slavery to the 
law of nations’ principles of comity (now classified as private international 
law).160  On what became a widely acknowledged understanding of the 
decision in the then British colonies in North America, the law of nations 
permitted one jurisdiction to refuse recognition of the effect of slavery in 
another.  The customary recognition of comity for property rights did not 
apply in the case of slavery.161 
One critical entailment of Somerset’s Case from the perspective of 
American constitution makers a decade later was that, under the law of 
nations, an enslaved person who entered free territory was no longer subject 
to the law of slavery of the state from which she came.162  How far the law 
of that “foreign” state would be respected depended on the local law of the 
forum state.  Southern slave owners at the Constitutional Convention 
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apprehended that they could not compel Northern states, with their 
intensifying hostility to slavery in the 1780s, to return enslaved persons who 
had escaped into their territory.163  With no explicit agreement, the default 
rule of the law of nations would control. 
This legal background explains the perceived need for the injunction in the 
Fugitive Slave Clause that 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered 
up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.164 
Notably, however, that clause was limited to enslaved persons who escaped 
to a free state.  It did not extend to a case like that of James Somerset, whose 
putative owner voluntarily transported him into a “free” jurisdiction.  This 
was true, Mansfield held, even within the quasi-confederation of the British 
Empire.165  As a consequence, it would remain in the discretion of each 
Northern state to decide whether to deem an enslaved person brought 
voluntarily into its territory to be free.  Nor was this a matter of controversy.  
Indeed, for several decades Southern state judges uniformly ruled not only 
that the law of nations permitted the Northern states to deem an enslaved 
person taken voluntarily into their territory free but also that under the 
principles of comity expressed in that law, their status as free persons would 
be respected even when they returned to the state in which they had originally 
been enslaved.166 
Southern courts shifted on the issue only in the late antebellum period, 
most notably in the litigation instituted by Dred Scott, which ultimately 
yielded the infamous Supreme Court decision.  This change reflected the 
intensifying sectional conflict that culminated in the Civil War.  Fittingly, the 
Supreme Court in Scott v. Sandford167 refused to exercise jurisdiction over 
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s refusal to apply the law of nations.168  But 
the deep engagement of the Constitution with the evolving law-of-nations 
approach to slavery belied Chief Justice Roger Taney’s unanalyzed dictum, 
coming as he vaulted the Fifth Amendment’s protection of property above 
the free soil principle of the law of nations, that “there is no law of nations 
standing between the people of United States and their Government.”169  As 
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it happened, there was.  Indeed, six years later, President Abraham Lincoln 
invoked the laws of war to emancipate all enslaved people in the secessionist 
states.170 
3.  The Law of Nations and the Governance of Empire 
The law of nations proved to be useful in yet another critical dimension of 
governance in the early republic.  Reflecting the fact that many European 
nations were also colonizing empires, the law of nations contained essential 
resources for constructing the imperial features of the American 
constitutional project, especially the relationship between the federal 
government and the Native American polities and the institution of 
slavery.171  European empire builders had long invoked the law of nations to 
conceptualize and justify the use of slave labor and to expropriate land from 
Indigenous populations.  The founding generation was deeply familiar with 
both fields of legal rationalization, as well as with the fast and unpredictable 
evolution of the consensual principles bearing on the two subjects during the 
late eighteenth-century Enlightenment.  As most white Americans ranked 
settlement and development of the continent’s interior as a high 
governmental priority—a project that required obtaining that land and then 
finding labor to develop it—engagement with the law of nations in both areas 
intensified after the Revolution.  In this sense, at least, the Constitution was 
imperial from the beginning. 
a.  Native America and the Constitution 
Many complexities surrounded the original constitutional status of Native 
American nations (or, as the drafters pointedly referred to them, tribes).  The 
degree of their sovereignty was hotly debated, often in juristic writings.  Its 
practical meaning, however, was worked out in diplomatic interactions.  
Historians have mined those interactions between the federal government, 
the states, and the Native Americans.172  These parties were never, however, 
the only participants in that struggle.  The British and Spanish empires, which 
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surrounded the American “neighborhood,”173 were also inside it.  Both 
empires had extensive military and commercial relations with Native 
American nations within the western cession.174  When the federal 
government began operations, commerce in land or goods with these western 
nations was largely imaginary.175  What was imagined, however, was 
boundless wealth for the new nation and its citizens.176 
Two textual hooks suggest the role that the law of nations played in 
structuring the relationship of the new government with the Native American 
polities.  One is the Treaty Clause.177  Treaty relations presumed that Native 
American polities were, legally, foreign.  This was how Britain and most of 
the European empires had conducted relations with the Native Americans, 
and the Federalists were determined to appear as though they were respecting 
imperial ways.178  Ironically, though, the primary audience for this 
international law claim was domestic:  the states.  Treating with the Native 
Americans was part of the project of centralizing key features of governance, 
especially foreign affairs and security, and it opened a new chapter in the 
long story of cooperation and competition between the federal and state 
governments for primacy in dealing with Native Americans.  The other hook 
was the so-called Indian Commerce Clause, sitting alongside the 
international and interstate commerce clauses.179  Although aimed at the 
states too, the Indian Commerce Clause signaled to foreign nations wishing 
to treat with Native Americans within the borders of the United States that 
the federal government claimed the power to regulate their trade.180  
Together, the two clauses traced the beginning of a complex strategy of 
federal governance over Native America:  a monopoly not only in relation to 
the states but also claimed against the neighboring empires.   The law of 
nations played a substantial role in both strategies, and Americans then added 
new elements to that law that other settler nations borrowed as they 
expropriated land and sovereignty from Indigenous people.  Few areas of 
early federal governance better demonstrate the power-conferring potential 
of the law of nations than its deployment to obtain Native Americans’ land 
and dominate their trade. 
Making the nations located in Native America dependent nations was one 
goal of Federalist governance under the new Constitution.  It was ambitious, 
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requiring defter diplomacy and stronger force than the founders had 
originally imagined.  It was at least a familiar project.  Dependency was a 
known status in the law of nations.  Vattel, for example, wrote of tributary 
states, feudal states, treaties of protection, and unequal alliances.181  Small 
nations frequently made treaties with larger or more powerful nations that 
delegated some national powers, typically defensive powers, from the 
dependent to the principal.  The “weak state” (as Vattel called the junior 
partner) might lose some freedom of action.182  If it “reserve[d] to itself the 
sovereignty, or the right of governing its own body, it ought to be considered 
as an independent state.”183  In sum, a weak state in a covenant for protection 
did not “on this account, cease to rank among the sovereigns who 
acknowledge no other law than that of nations.”184 
A dependent relationship, therefore, was something like a partial, issue-
specific confederacy between two nations.  The relationship and remedies 
were bilateral.  Treaties of dependency did not bind third parties, although 
when publicized, they did suggest that consequences might follow outside 
interference.  The European empires repeatedly used such treaties in Native 
America in the century before the Revolution.  The example of Sir William 
Johnson, the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern 
Department, and his decades-long relationship with (most of) the Six Nations 
was well known to revolutionaries who fought in the Northern states and then 
to federal state builders (often the same individuals).185 
Persuading everyone across the Atlantic world that these dependent 
nations were also domestic nations was another thing altogether.  That 
required turning a contractual relationship into a monopolistic property right, 
excluding all interference by all other nations.  It also involved converting 
“borderlands” into “borders” and claiming that other nations could not reach 
across them to engage in trade and diplomacy with Native Americans, at least 
not without the consent of the United States as expressed in a treaty.186  Early 
Americans tried to convert an international treaty relationship into a national 
one, closer along the spectrum to confederation, without the equal footing 
and shared decision-making that characterized confederations.  It was a 
fantasy from the perspective of 1789.  Yet Washington’s cabinet believed in 
it.  Benefitting as they often did from European catastrophe from 1793 to 
1815, successive federal administrations moved far toward reaching it—at 
the expense of Native American autonomy.187 
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b.  Slavery and the Constitution 
The place of slavery within the eighteenth-century law of nations might be 
as complicated as its place within the Constitution.  The latter relationship 
remains deeply contested among historians.188  Famously, although the 
drafters avoided the term, slavery shaped congressional representation, the 
Electoral College, the taxing power, the relationship between individual 
states, and the federal power to regulate the international trade in human 
beings.189  That cumulative effect was substantial, as Northern anti-
Federalists were quick to observe during the ratification debates.190  Daring 
not to speak the word, though, said something.  And the oblique way that the 
drafters did write about slavery reflected their understanding of its legal 
standing within the contemporary law of nations.  One reason they could say 
so little was because the legal premises were so well understood. 
That understanding was transatlantic.  Again, at about the same time as the 
American Revolution, the European nations and empires began to 
deaccession slavery from the law of nations.191  Americans who supported 
the elimination of slavery grabbed hold of these developments and then 
helped accelerate them.192  The loss of this bulwark of legitimation, reflected 
most famously in Somerset’s Case, sent supporters of slavery searching for 
new justifications within municipal law. 
The clause forbidding Congress to prohibit the trade in human lives before 
1808,193 for example, should be read against the background of 
developments in the law of nations.  The legality of the slave trade had long 
rested on the justification that the laws of war permitted conquerors to 
enslave their enemies as a lesser form of punishment than death.  But as early 
modern Europeans began to reject the ancient Roman law rule in wars among 
themselves, the legal justification for the slave trade too came under pressure.  
In the ensuing decades, some, like Chief Justice John Marshall, argued that 
the laws of war among African nations still legitimized the practice.194  
Others rejected the argument that the slave trade could be conducted under 
legal auspices at all.  Justice Joseph Story, for example, later credited the 
United States with “having set the first example of prohibiting the further 
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progress of this inhuman traffic.”195  As enslavement was jettisoned from the 
laws of war, engaging in the transatlantic trade became a source of 
transnational censure, while prohibiting it became one of emulation and 
coordination.  One example of the latter was the transatlantic correspondence 
between the British Abolition Society and American manumission societies 
and state governments during the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution.196 
Prohibiting the trade was a mechanism by which the new nation could 
contribute to reforming the law of nations.  When delegates from Northern 
states at the Constitutional Convention proposed prohibiting the trade, 
however, representatives from the Deep South wrested a compromise:  
Congress would have no power to prohibit the trade for twenty years.  The 
expectation was that, then, it would do so.197  The result was indirectly 
coordinated and nearly simultaneous prohibitions on the international slave 
trade in the British Empire and the United States. 
As the legal justification for initial enslavement and the slave trade eroded, 
slavery itself came under pressure.198  The legal default was, increasingly, 
free soil.  Slavery required protection in the positive municipal law, which, 
again, is why Southerners demanded the Fugitive Slave Clause.199  More 
generally, proslavery advocates developed the municipal law of property as 
the primary bulwark against legal challenges to slavery itself, putting 
constitutional protections of property on a collision course with the law of 
nations premises of the Constitution’s federal structure.200 
C.  The General Law of Nations:  Maritime and Commercial Law 
Yet another field in which the founding generation employed the law of 
nations to govern their federal state was the regulation of private transactions 
in a range of disparate but important areas.  Early American lawyers 
classified an assortment of fields as part of the law of nations.  Trading with 
the enemy was one and it was widely applied by the courts without the need 
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for legislation.  Conflict of laws, foreign judgments, and foreign evidence 
were part of what one commentator called “The minor Law of Nations.”201 
The largest remaining field, however, was not minor at all:  commercial 
law.  Modern lawyers might classify the subject as the epitome of private 
law.  Early American lawyers were more likely to call it public law.202  It had 
two branches:  the law of merchants and maritime law.203  These were not 
actually two separate subjects.  Rather, both were species of commercial law, 
with one covering transactions on land and the other those made on or 
concerning oceanic trade.  The premise was the same:  because the 
underlying activity tended to transcend national borders, so should the law 
governing it. 
This notion that commercial law was a transnational subject was common 
across eighteenth-century Europe.  The proximate doctrinal source of this 
faith in the United States was again Lord Mansfield.  “When Lord Mansfield 
mentioned the law of merchants as being a branch of public law,” Kent 
observed in his Commentaries on American Law, 
it was because that law did not rest essentially for its character and authority 
on the positive institutions and local customs of any particular country, but 
consisted of certain principles and usages of trade, which general 
convenience, and a common sense of justice had established, to regulate 
the dealings of merchants and mariners in all the commercial countries of 
the civilized world.204 
Here “public law” was a rhetorical highlighter, referring to the law of nations 
and designed to place such transactions beyond the jurisdiction of municipal 
law.  It was a hybrid:  intrinsically international but concerning individuals.  
Two local merchants creating a negotiable instrument or insuring a vessel’s 
cargo were, whether they knew it or not, supporting actors in the epic drama 
of civilization.  And so their deal ought to be governed by the law of civilized 
states. 
Some American judges took the universal conceit further and argued that 
even legislatures could not alter these rules.  “From the nature of commerce,” 
wrote New Hampshire Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith in 1806, 
it is not capable of being regulated by the municipal laws of individual 
states, but it must be governed by a code, which is respected by all civilized 
nations, and denominated the Law Merchant.  In respect of the universality 
of this system, it may be considered as a portion of the law of nations; not 
indeed regulating the intercourse of independent states, but obligatory on 
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the individuals of each state among themselves, and with the citizens of 
other states, in the multifarious transactions of trade and commerce.205 
Although this belief in an insulated and apolitical transnational 
commercial law, supreme over municipal law, persisted throughout the 
nineteenth century, it was never the dominant view.206  More subtly, many 
lawyers assumed that legislatures should not change the substance of 
commercial rules, though they had freer rein with altering remedies.  Justice 
Story endorsed this view in his opinion in Swift v. Tyson,207 in which he 
claimed that the federal courts, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, had the power 
to determine the applicable rules governing commercial law disputes, at least 
in the absence of governing state statutes.208  The transnational premise of 
this doctrine has been lost by finding that the court upheld “federal general 
common law,”209 whereas in that much-misunderstood decision, Story did 
not refer to the common law.  The relevant rule was found elsewhere, in the 
cosmopolitan body of commercial jurisprudence.  “The general principles of 
commercial law” were distinct and universal.210  Therefore, in the absence of 
clear municipal law to the contrary, that transnational law operated in and 
among the states.211 
It is therefore ironic that today some legal academics and judges believe 
just the opposite about the law of nations.  They argue that all of the law of 
nations—all international law outside the similarly constricting zone of treaty 
law—is effectively just state common law and even then only insofar as the 
state courts choose so to recognize it and the state legislatures refrain, in their 
free discretion, from overruling or revising it.212 
CONCLUSION 
The law of nations was a pervasive language of governance in early 
America.  The Federalists found in it a multidimensional resource for nation 
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building that was not narrowly concerned with international relations.  
Instead, it was a capacious body of principles, maxims, and case histories for 
governing, both at home and abroad.  The law of nations also imported a 
reflexive mode of reasoning, in which policy decisions were supposed to be 
considered from the perspective not just of local interest but also of an 
imagined impartial spectator. 
Three dimensions of the law of nations were particularly useful in the early 
republic.  First, it was an indispensable resource for claiming independence 
and then performing nationhood on the international stage.  Second, the 
comparative public law dimension proved useful to structuring the federal 
state, in its vertical and horizontal dimensions, and for according it power to 
act like a civilized nation and, for better or worse, an empire.  Finally, the 
transnational dimension of the law of nations provided a body of legal 
principles to facilitate American citizens’ engagements in commercial and 
other unofficial transactions with individuals from other nations. 
